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able as any other would be the conclusion-that the owner of a penknife carried
it for the purpose of trimming his nails. If a loaded pistol is substituted for the
open penknife, the range of inferences is narrowed and the relevance increased
correspondingly. If a closed penknife is substituted for the open one, relevancy
approaches the vanishing point.
A determination of the admissibility of nonassertive conduct of the Griffin
type should depend on a consideration of whether, in view of the particular facts
of the case, evidence of this bit of the deceased's conduct prior to the homicide
increased the likelihood of subsequent aggressive conduct on his part toward the
defendant.2 3When evidence of the nonassertive conduct is newly discovered and
a new trial is sought, an application of the reasonable-possibility test demands a
close examination of all of the relevant facts,24 a case-to-case determination, not
2
the drawing of conclusions based on generalizations. 5

LEGISLATIVE PROGRESS AND JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE
IN ILLINOIS DIVORCE REFORM
By declaring the Domestic Relations Act of 1949 unconstitutional in People
ex rel. Bernat v. Bicek,' the Illinois Supreme Court again invalidated legislative
experiments for a new approach to divorce. The Act was designed to obviate
the objection to, and achieve the same ends as its ill-fated predecessor, the
Domestic Relations Act of 1947. The earlier Act was held to be a special law
because it limited the establishment of a divorce division to Cook County. 3
The 194 9 Act provided for the establishment of a divorce division in any circuit where the majority of circuit court judges so voted,4 thus rendering the
23 At trial, a doubt as to the relevancy of the evidence might properly be resolved in favor
of admissibility.
24 A showing that the deceased habitually carried a weapon, for example, would detract
from the probative value of evidence that he carried a weapon on the occasion of the homicide.
2sThere is great difficulty in applying any standard depending on the weight of evidence.
Harmless Error Rule Reviewed, 47 Col. L. Rev. 450 (1947). Perhaps in allowing Griffin a
new trial the Court of Appeals simply demonstrated its reluctance to utter the final word
condemning him to death. But if the evidence of the type put forth in the Griffin case is of
sufficient weight to raise the necessary reasonable possibility it is difficult to see how any
relevant evidence discovered after the trial could fail to meet that standard.
x405 Il. 5io, 91 N.E. 2d 588 (ig5o).

2fll.

Rev. Stat. (i947) c. 37, § io5-

3Hunt v. Cook County, 398 Ill. 412, 76 N.E. 2d 48 (I947); Ill. L. (1947) 813. The divorce
division proposed in the 1947 Act was to perform the same functions as the divorce divisions
proposed in the I949 Act, discussed herein. The basic difference was that the 1947 Act applied
unly to Cook County. For a full discussion of the 1947 Act see Unconstitutionality of Illinois
Divorce Act, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 770 (1948).
4fli. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 37, § 105.20. In Cook County the circuit and superior courts were
to establish the divorce division by joint resolution, the city courts having no vote. See note
io infra.
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institution dependent on "local" circumstances.S As in the old Act, the divorce
divisions in the new Act were to provide the machinery for reconciliation in the
form of masters' hearings which would apply the social agency technique to
marital discord. 6 Investigations and reports about the financial, cultural, moral,
and social background of the parties, which would enable the judge to make
7
more intelligent disposition of custody and support matters, were to be made.
In addition, the divisions were to act as a clearing house for support payments,
enabling the court to check arrearages at the earliest possible moment. 8
In upholding the petitioner in a taxpayer's suit to enjoin the enforcement of
the Act, the Court relied on the following grounds: (i) an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative powers to the judiciary was found in the fact that
judges were permitted to determine what the law shall be in their circuit; 9 (2)
the constitutionally guaranteed powers of city courts were held to be infringed
by the fact that judges were not given a vote in the establishment of the divorce
division in their circuit;10 (3) since the circuit court judges in Cook County and
the city court judges throughout the state constitute a minority of those exercising divorce jurisdiction within each circuit, it was argued that the power of
these courts to make their own rules was usurped-a majority vote being
sufficient under the Act to establish binding rules;"! (4) the Act lacked the required uniformity throughout the state, since parties in some circuits would be
subject to special divorce division procedure and those in others would not;' 2
(5) deprivation of the parties' rights was found because the masters were given
power to investigate and hear, the possible result of which was a material delay
in the formal hearing of a cause;z3 (6) the First Amendment of the federal Constitution was held to be violated by allowing ministers, rabbis, and priests to
be called in by the master in attempts to reconcile the parties;4 and (7) due
s The real need for such a plan was believed to be in Cook County, because there the anonymity of urban living is said to reduce the social pressures of responsibility toward the family
in matters of support and the provision of a stable home life for the children of broken or about
to be broken families. In Hunt v. Cook County, 398 Ill. 412, 420, 76 N.E. 2d 48, 53 (1947), the
court took a different view: "The incidents of divorce and separation of married persons and
parents with attendant social instabilities and possible dependency and delinquency are largely
the same throughout the State." For comment on this point, see Unconstitutionality of Illinois
Divorce Act, 1S Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 770, 772 (1948).
6ll. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 37, § 105.30.

8 Ibid., at §0os.33.
7Ibid., at §105.27.
9Bernat v. Bicek, 405 Ill. 510, 517, Si8, 9I N.E. 2d 588,

591, 592 (195o).
zo Ibid., at 5x8 and 592; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 37, § io5.2o. The city courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts. ll. Rev. Stat. (z949) c. 37, § 333- Consequently, the
divorce division also would be part of city court divorce procedure.
xx Bernat v. Bicek, 405 ll. 510, 520, 521, 91 N.E. 2d 588, 593 (195o); Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949)
c. 37, § 105.25.
- Bernat v. Bicek, 405 Ill. 5,0, 519, 520, 91 N.E. 2d 588, 594 (z95o).
X3Ibid., at 522 and 595.
X4 Ibid., at 525 and 595; ll. Rev. Stat. (i949) c. 37, § 105.30.
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process was found to be jeopardized as investigations and reports would take
the place of evidence received subject to cross-examination.I s
A critique of the court's reasoning may help to steer future draftsmen of
similar legislation around the barriers that have been placed in their predecessors' way. As to the delegation of legislative powers to the judiciary, the court,
reasoning from authority,16 assumed that legislation must be "absolute" when
it leaves the legislature. However, as far back as 1848 in People v. Reynolds the
Supreme Court of Illinois said: "While all must be done under their [the legislators'] sanction, yet they need not do all, nor command all. A law may depend
upon a future event or contingency for its taking effect, and that contingency
may arise from the voluntary acts of others." 7
The court proceeded to explain that private corporations and municipal
corporations may be created by local option, and further stated: "All such laws
are perfect and complete when they leave the hands of the legislature, although
a future event shall determine whether they can take effect or not."' s
This line of reasoning was followed in People ex rel. Grinnell v. Hoffman,19
where the court upheld a law regulating elections which depended upon local
voting to take effect. Local option laws have been used to set up the Municipal
Court of Cook County 2 and various city courts throughout the State.21 Local
option need not be restricted to the electorate; in fact judges have been allowed
to exercise such power.2 Since judges are in the best position to determine the
advisability of a divorce division in their circuit, there appears to be no justifiable reason for the exclusion of the city court judges from voting.23 Future
draftsmen should note this easily correctible oversight.
On the other hand, city court judges were given a vote in making rules for
the divorce division.24 Nevertheless, the court held that the Act invited a
usurpation of their judicial powers, at least in Cook County. The court argued,
that because the Superior Court of Cook County had twenty-eight judges, the
Circuit Court of Cook County twenty, and the city courts in Cook County two,
the Superior Court could enforce its will upon the circuit and city courts.
joint rule-making power does not necessarily lead to usurpation of any court's
2

.s Bemat v. Bicek, 405 Ill. 5io, 526, 527, 91 N.E. 2d 588, 596 (i95o); Il. Rev. Stat. (i949)
C. 37,
x6

§§ 105.31, 105.32, 105.35.
R. G. Lydy, Inc. v. Chicago, 356 l. 230,

Ill. 82, 176 N.E. 333 (1931)

19oN.E. 273 (1934); Welton v. Hamilton, 344

•

17 1o Ill. i, 12, 13 (1848).

XsIbid., at 13.

19116 Ill. 587, 5 N.E. 596 (i886).
"0Municipal Court Act, ill. Rev. Stat. (i949) c. 37, § 503.
21City Court Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 37, § 333.

"See People ex rel. Dunham v. Morgan, 90 Ill. 558, 563 (1878).
23 Note

io supra.

'4 Note ii supra.
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judicial power, unless every court is held to be constitutionally vested with a
right to make its own rules independent of all other courts. Since no authority
which grants such a right has been found, there is no reason why any one vote
should be counted differently than others. It must also be noted that the
problems of divorce division administration would have been the same within
the contiguous confines of Cook County and merited the uniform procedure
which would have been the result of joint rule making.25
The argument that the law lacked uniformity is based upon the assumptions that the problems of divorce are the same throughout the State, and that
the statute would not operate equally upon all persons. The court's first assumption is contrary to the expert opinion of sociologists and social welfare workers
who have consistently emphasized that the problems of divorce are not the
same in rural and urban areas.26 The legislature appeared to recognize this when
they employed the "local option" form. The second assumption is equally
fallacious. Since divorce jurisdiction is limited to the county where the plaintiff
or defendant lives, 27 the Act would apply equally to all parties seeking a divorce
in any given circuit2 In Hinckley v. Dean it was held that the uniformity
clause of the Illinois Constitution is not violated if a court in one circuit adopts
a rule of procedure which operates fairly, equally, and uniformly on all litigants
within the circuit.29 The 1949 Act was in terms a procedural reform rather than
a change of the substantive law and would readily come under the doctrine of
the Hinckley case.
In sustaining the petitioner's argument that the master's hearing would
deprive the parties of their rights without due process, the court rejected the
showing, by amicus curiae,30 that there were precedents for the proposed procedure. Amicus curiae pointed to the act relating to treatment of dependent,
neglected, and delinquent children,3' and the adoption act. 32 These statutes
provide for preliminary investigations and reports which have to be filed before
formal hearing will be given. The court distinguished these statutes by stating
that divorce was an adversary procedure, while the two acts cited related to
"agency type" procedure. This reasoning neglects the fact that formerly juvenile
25 The city courts of Calumet City and Chicago Heights would quite probably have been
opposed to joint rule making. If these courts could maintain "liberal" rules for divorce while
the circuit and superior courts adopted a more orderly divorce procedure, their divorce
business would flourish even more.
27 fIL. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 40, § 6.
26 Note 5 supra.
28Whether a couple is divorced in a circuit where there is a divorce division or not does not
depend upon their volition, but rather upon the judicial appraisal of local circumstances in the
first instance of establishing the division.
29 104 Ill. 63o, 636 (1882).

30Mr. Charles Leviton was asked to file an amicus curiae brief by the judges of the Circuit
and Superior Courts of Cook County for the Chicago Bar Association. Amicus Curiae brief
at 2.
31

Ill. Rev. Star. (1949) C.23, § 19c, et seq.

32

Ibid., at c. 4, § i-x et seq.
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court matters were decided in adversary procedure until replaced by the modem
agency type procedure.33 There seem to be no "vested rights" standing in the
way of revising divorce procedure in the same manner. The laws granting and
regulating divorce are privileges granted by the state. The law, and quite particularly that of Illinois, is explicit in not making divorce dependent on the
wishes of the individual; consequently, the individual can as little claim that
he is being deprived of a "right" when the state decides to change its divorce
procedure to allow pre-trial hearing34 as he could if the state should decide to
eliminate one of the grounds for divorce or to abolish divorce altogether.
s
The court relied on Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educafion td support their conclusion that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution would be violated when religious representatives would be called into the
master's hearing to advise the parties. It is difficult to determine the exact scope
of that interpretation of the First Amendment. The best solution, to avoid controversy of a highly speculative nature, would be to draft the related provision
in general terms avoiding specific reference to religious representatives. 6 If
this were done the master still would be able to call in religious representatives,
but objections of the type raised in Bernat v. Bicek 37 would be avoided.
The argument that the Act permitted violations of procedural due process
by substituting reports based on investigations for evidence subject to crossexamination assumes that parties will not obtain a judicial consideration of
the relative claims of their case nor an opportunity to rebut factual statements
gathered by experts and conclusions drawn therefrom. Investigations serve as
a basis for decisions in other areas. The act relating to the treatment of dependent, neglected, and delinquent children utilizes this method of ascertaining facts.a3 The court in Lindsay v. Lindsay,39 upheld this act and its method of
Other procedural trends, designed to define the issues before formal hearings or trials be(1949) c. io, § 259.23A, which
calls in all ordinary civil cases for a pre-trial conference, and the similar Federal provision,
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. i6 (i949). Pre-trial conferences
are had at the judge's discretion and are designed to simplify the formal proceedings. The
1949 Act is similar to Rule 23A in its provisions for a master's hearing, investigation and report. The referral to the divorce division was designed to aid the judge by simplifying the
issues and supplying the judge with information gathered prior to the trial.
33

gin, are reflected by Supreme Court Rule 23A, Ill. Rev. Stat.

Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (19o3); Ainer, Conciliation Rather Than Recon43 Ill. L. R. 464, 468 (1948). This article discusses the right of the state to set condidivorce, as well as procedural rules.
U.S. 203 (1948).
o
36l1. Rev. Stat. (i949) c. 37, § 1o5.3 . The provision might be drafted to read: "In a hearing to ascertain the possibility of reconciliation, the master shall, at his own discretion, utilize
the resources, information, counselling and advice available in the community." This is general enough to include religious representatives as well as sociologists, psychologists, and
34 See
ciliation,
tions for
35 333

others.
N.E. 2d 588, 595 (i95o).
38 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) C.23, § i9o et seq.
39 257 Ill. 328, ioo N.E. 892 (1913).
37405 Ill. 510, 525, 91

COMMENTS

investigation and report. In People v. Miller4V the court sustained investigations and reports in probation matters. The petitioner in that case claimed that
the report rendered to the judge precluded judicial discretion in determining
whether probation was to be granted or not. But the court held that even
though there was a report before the judge, it would not mean that full judicial consideration of the petitioner's cause was precluded.
The Domestic Relations Act of 1949 would have been a step in the attempt
to revise the laws relating to divorce in the United States. Proponents of a general revision movement point out that the present system of divorce law does
not address itself to the basic issues of divorce but concerns itself with irrelevant
formalities.4' A total revision of divorce law has been said to require two steps:
first, a change of procedure; and second, a change in the substantive law. The
1949 Act was of the first type, a procedural reform.
The substitution of an "agency" approach to divorce for the traditional adversary procedure is expressive of a trend similar to that appearing in the
handling of juvenile court matters. 42 Steps toward a new approach to divorce
have been adopted in some form in several jurisdictions; they have been proposed in others. Detroit uses a divorce proctor, known as Friend of the Court,
who tries to reconcile the parties and who makes reports based on investigation
of custody and support matters. 43 Milwaukee, Wisconsin, has a similar plan.44
Ohio has what might be called a "true family court," combined juvenile and
divorce jurisdiction, in seven circuits. These courts are aided by a social service
investigative arm. They try to maintain informal procedure which will arrive
at the underlying causes of the "litigants"' problems. 45 At the present time,
plans for a conciliation service, similar to the 1949 Illinois Act's divorce divisions, are under way in New Jersey,46 while the District of Columbia is studying
7
a plan modeled on Detroit's Friend of the Court.4
40317

fI. 33,

T47

N.E. 396

(1925);

also see New York v. Williams,

337 U.S. 241 (1949).

41See especially, Alexander, The Follies of Divorce-A Therapeutic Approach to the

Problem, ['9491 Univ. of Ill. Law Forum 695. Judge Alexander discusses various proposals for
divorce law revision made by others. See also, Rheinstein, Family Law Revision, in Fact Finding Report of the Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth (95o).
4The State as Parens Patriae: Juvenile versus The Divorce Courts on Questions Pertaining to Custody, 21 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 375 (1949), a discussion of the merits of "agency" procedure as against adversary procedure. Also, Alexander, op. cit. supra note 41, at 707-8, for

the outline of an ideal family court based on juvenile court practice.
43 Rule 25 of Wayne County (Michigan) Circuit Court; Cooper, The Friend of the Divorce
Court, 20oJ. Am. Jud. Soc. 125 (i936); Porknay, Friend of the Court Aids Detroit Judges in
Divorce Cases, 29 J.Am. Jud. Soc. 166 (1946).
44Wis. Stat. (Brossard, i949) §252.07.
4SThe two most outstanding Ohio courts in this field are Hamilton County (Cincinnati)
and Lucas County (Toledo). Ohio Code Ann. (Throckmorton, X948) §§ 1532, 1639-8.
col. 6 (Sept.
46 N.Y. Times, p. 23, col. 5 (Sept. 8,i95o); Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, p. i,
i i, xg5o); the plan calls for conciliation especially where children are involved.
47

District of Columbia Court Plans To Set Up Office of Marital Affairs Counsel, 34 J. Am.

Jud. Soc. 55 (ig5o).
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The Illinois Act would have remedied many of the shortcomings of our present divorce system. Improper custody awards or failure of the courts to keep
abreast of current facts and make changes in custody, where the original custody has been unsatisfactory, are said to be a substantial causal factor in child
delinquency.45 The pre-d ecree hearings, investigations, and report of the divorce
division would have partially eliminated errors in original custody which are
brought on by lack of such information, while the periodical reports required of
the person or the agency to whom custody has been awarded would have enabled the court to keep abreast of the child's current welfare and bring about
needed adjustments.49 Dependency upon state funds is sometimes the result of
poor administration of alimony and support orders.50 If the father-husband falls
behind in his payments, the court has no knowledge of this fact until the injured
party comes into court through a private attorney or legal aid. S' Under the
1949 Act alimony and support money would have had to be paid into the
divorce division to be distributed to the beneficiaries.S2 The court would have
been able to keep a constant surveillance of support payments and detect
arrearage at the earliest possible moment.
In spite of all the above listed benefits, the Act has not gone unchallenged.
Some point out that the master's hearing, with its concomitant investigation,
would uncover collusion which had heretofore remained undiscovered in the
mock battle of the adversary procedure, thereby substantially decreasing the
number of divorces where "legal guilt" is absent. It is their contention that such
a result would be inherently evil, since those couples who are basically incompatible would be forced to maintain their marital status. However, as has
been observed, divorce is not a right but a privilege granted by the state. It
cannot be said, therefore, that there is a "right" to collusive divorce. What is involved here is a serious objection based on notions of social policy. This is not
an objection to the 1949 Act, but rather an objection to the present status of
the substantive law of divorce.
Others, authorities in the field of family relations, have categorically, though
confidentially, stated that reconciliation through a legal agency is impossible.
This position seems unduly fatalistic. The state is vitally interested in the
problem of conserving the family and could well adapt itself to such a function.
Judge Julius Miner of the Circuit Court of Cook County opposed the Act
45 This statement is based on a study by judge Edwin A. Robson of the Superior Court of
Cook County; for figures on this proposition see Unconstitutionality of Illinois Divorce Act,
15 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 770 (1948).
49flI. Rev. Stat. (i949) c. 37, § I05.34.
50 Note 48 supra.
s1The Court Service of the Welfare Department of Cook County also represents needy
parties in support enforcement proceedings, but there, too, the injured party must take the
initiative. Obscurity to the public and lack of adequate staff render it less effective than it
should be.
52 Ill. Rev. Stat. (z949) c. 37, § 105.33.
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because he believes that reconciliation after the parties have filed divorce actions comes too late. He would substitute a pre-filing conciliation procedure s3
This plan actually amounts to "passive" reconciliation. If the parties are made
to file a declaration of intent sixty days prior to the suit, it reasonably may be
assumed that the "breaking point" has already been reached. Judge Miner
merely proposed a "cooling off period" during which the parties are left to their
own initiative. The Act, on the other hand, would have brought the resources
of the community to bear in an active attempt to settle the difference between
the parties.
Merely because acts like the Domestic Relations Act of 1949 are only part of a
needed scheme of revision in the field of divorce, their enactment should not be
defeated. Many of the problems in the area of divorce administration would be
remedied, while the remaining substantive evils would be sharply defined, to be
corrected by additional legislative action.

CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES AND "JUST COMPENSATION"
IN FEDERAL CONDEMNATIONS
In federal condemnations' the courts have applied the term "consequential
damages" to all losses which have been excluded from the "just compensation"
provision of the Fifth Amendment. 2 In seizing private property the government has had to pay only for tangible interests actually taken 3 and those intangible interests which the courts have held to be directly connected with the
physical substance of the thing taken. 4 No payment has been necessary for in'3 Miner, op. cit. supra note 34; Miner, Pre-Divorce Suit Conciliation, 36 Ill. Bar J.
(1948).
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1 Many state constitutions provide that compensation must be paid for property "taken or
damaged." In such cases consequential damages may be recovered. 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 6.4432[21 (195o). See Dolan, Consequential Damages in Federal Condemnation, 35
Va. L. Rev. 1059 (i949).
2"[Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." United
States v. Petty Motors Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373 (1945); United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943); Mitchell v. United States, 267
U.S. 341 (1925); Joslin Manufacturing Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668 (z923); Omnia Co. v.
United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923).
3United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (i945); Redman v. United States,
203 (C.A. 4 th, 1943); Karlson v. United States, 82 F. 2d 330 (C.A. 8th, 1936).
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United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368
Sharp v. United States, i91 U.S. 341 (19o3); Stephenson Brick Co. v. United States,
i i F. 2d 36o (C.A. 5 th, 1940). A typical payment for an injury directly connected with the
condemnation is one for severance damages, i.e., the loss resulting from the decreased market
value of a single tract of land because of the condemnation of part of it. This type of injury has
always been compensated for.
4

(1924);

